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Abstract
We explore the empirical interaction between firm growth, financing constraints and job creation. Using a
novel small business survey from Uganda, we find that the extent to which small businesses expand skilled
employment as their sales and profits increase depends significantly on access to external funding. The results
are robust to the inclusion of various firm level controls, region and sector fixed effects. We address reverse
causality concerns by providing empirical evidence using planned hiring regression specifications.
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1 Introduction
Creating stable employment opportunities is a primary concern for policymakers in many developing economies.
Most developing countries in Africa have grown rapidly over the past decade, even as the Global Recession has
gripped many European countries and the United States. Since most of its countries have become independent
around 1960, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced the best decade of growth between 2000-2012, where GDP
grew more than 4.5% annually on average. However, this growth has not translated into similarly high growth
rates in job creation. In many countries in Africa, the source of growth has primarily relied upon oil, gas and
mineral extraction. Even though the number of industrial sector jobs is projected to increase 55 percent over
the next 10 years, the growth comes from a small base and will not come close to absorbing the millions of
new workers entering the labor force each year (Brooks et al., 2014). What is even more challenging is that
many educated workers also fail to be absorbed into the labor market. The unemployed supply of high skill hu-
man capital raises the question of whether there is a shortage of firm-level demand for skill in African economies.
The vast literature on finance and growth has argued the importance of access to external funding for firm-
level investment decisions, economic development and growth. Access to credit remains difficult for firms in
Sub-Saharan Africa and continues to top the policy agendas concerning African economic development. In this
context, while several papers have documented the relationship between financing constraints and capital in-
vestment and growth, there are relatively few papers gauging the importance of financing constraints for hiring
decisions, especially of skilled workers. The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of financial constraints
in firms’ skilled labor demand. Specifically, using a small business survey from Uganda, we test whether the
likelihood of skilled job creation at profitable businesses rises with access to external finance.
Economic theory predicts a critical role of financing constraints in hiring decisions, similar to the role that
they have for capital investment (Benmelech et al., 2011). First, timing differences between when wages are
paid and when revenues are received might require the need for working capital, and the lack of it could cause
constrained labor demand. This results in a stronger financing constraint in the case of hiring skilled workers,
because skilled employees often get paid a skill-premium and hence receive higher wages and the expected con-
tribution of skilled workers for future revenues might be relatively more intangible than unskilled labor - raising
firm-level uncertainty. Second, if hiring of permanent staff implies fixed costs (including training or firing costs),
this might require additional funding, again an effect which is expected to be stronger for skilled and experienced
workers (Oi, 1962). Third, job creation might be restricted by financing constraints if capital and labor are
complementary factors in the production process. Finally, the decision whether to hire permanent or fixed-term
employees (Caggese and Cuñat, 2008) is likely to be more pronounced for hiring of skilled and experienced work-
ers, where wages are higher and outside options are more for the workers. We expect all of these channels to be
stronger at profitable firms on growth paths, where demand for skilled and experienced workers should be higher.
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We empirically explore the interactions between financing constraints, firm growth - measured in sales (as
well as in profits) - and job creation. Using a comprehensive small business survey data collected in 2013 from
a nationwide representative sample of 1,839 Ugandan companies, we test the extent to which access to external
bank funding conditions the relationship between firm growth and employment creation. Following Popov and
Udell (2012), Brown, Ongena, Popov and Yein (2011), Cox and Jappelli (1993), and Duca and Rosenthal (1993),
we isolate demand from supply-side financial constraints by distinguishing between firms that (i) applied for
and received a loan, (ii) were rejected or discouraged from applying for a loan, and (iii) do not need a loan. Our
survey also allows us to distinguish between different types of employee categories at a given establishment such
as trained and experienced; as well as permanent, casual and family/friends. Our survey data and methodology
thus allows us to differentiate (i) between demand and supply of external finance, (ii) between the hiring of
skilled and experienced workers and hiring of casual workers and family members where we do not expect an
effect of financing constraints, and (iii) finally between firms on different growth paths. While the cross-sectional
nature of our data and estimation does not allow us to completely control for endogeneity, we relate today’s
financing constraints to future hiring plans, thus controlling effectively for reverse causation.
While we use data for one specific Sub-Saharan African country, Uganda resembles in its economic and
demographic structure many other developing economies. Uganda is a landlocked low-income country in Africa,
which has experienced high GDP growth over the recent years, reaching 4.8% in 2013 and even higher rates
were projected for 2014. However, the vast majority of Uganda’s labor force remains employed in relatively low
productivity sectors, such as agriculture (World Bank, 2013). Ugandans with higher education are more likely
to be unemployed and to under-utilize their skill sets. Many educated workers are employed in a job ill-suited
to their skills or emigrate to find appropriate employment (EDPRD Uganda, 2014). Uganda has the world’s
youngest population with over 78% of its population below the age of 30. The population continues to grow at a
rate of 3.2% annually and the country has one of the highest youth unemployment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa
(The State of Uganda Population Report, 2013). Many of the new entrants are highly educated as a result of
past policies to encourage school enrolment and completing further education. There is a strong pool of talent
to be utilized and the binding constraints for job creation remain on the firm side (EDPRD Uganda, 2014). The
challenge for Ugandan policy makers is thus to oversee the labor force’s effective transition from a predominantly
low productivity and agriculture based economy to a high-human capital intensive - manufacturing and service
sector based - economy.
Our empirical analysis shows that growing and profitable small businesses create more jobs for trained and
experienced workers - which we interpret as demand for skill - if they have access to external finance. Specifically,
growing and profitable firms only hire experienced and trained employees if they are not rejected or discouraged
from applying for external finance. In our regression analysis we do not find such a significant relationship
in the case of hiring casual employees or family and friends, suggesting that - in line with theory - financing
constraints are more likely to bind in the context of employment contracts associated with experienced and
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trained employees with high human capital intensity. These results are robust to a large set of firm level con-
trols as well as region and sector fixed effects. Our results suggest that financially constrained firms save their
excess resources instead of investing in more sophisticated and skilled labor-force. These results are in line with
prior and well established conclusions emphasized by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), who document that firms on
growth path are more likely to invest in physical capital when provided with access to finance. Our findings
are robust to alternative classifications of financial access. Our results also hold when we regress firms’ future
hiring intensions (i.e. planned hiring) on firm performance and financial access - after controlling for recent
hiring trends at the firm. The results from this latter regression support the argument that our benchmark
results are not likely to be driven by a reverse causation bias.
The findings from our research have important policy implications as they underline the importance of well
developed financial systems for job creation. As policy makers grapple with the challenge of creating formal
and permanent jobs in a still growing society, financial sector policies can be critical. Our results also show that
beyond helping firms grow faster, more efficient financial systems can also have an impact on poverty alleviation
by helping urgently needed jobs.
Our paper is relevant for several strands of literature. First, we add to the literature on financing con-
straints in developing economies. These include a series of papers that investigate the effects of firm financing
constraints on firm growth (Ayyagari et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2005; Beck et al., 2008) as well as firm sales and
performance (Banerjee and Duflo, 2014; Zia, 2008; De Mel et al., 2008) Second, we add to a smaller and more
recent literature on the relationship between financing constraints and job creation. These include, Pagano and
Pica (2012) who show a positive and significant relationship between financial development and job creation
in developing countries. For the U.S., Beck, Levine and Levkov (2010) show that branch deregulation and
consequent financial liberalization led to decreases in unemployment and increased labor market participation
especially among low-skilled workers. Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) showed that financially constrained
firms planned to fire more employees during the financial crisis of 2008. They surveyed 1,050 CFOs in the U.S,
Europe and Asia and overall they found that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, capital
and most relevantly, employment. On a similar note, Brown and Matsa (2016) show that firm financial distress
results in fewer and lower quality job applicants. Giné and Townsend (2004) show for Thailand that financial
liberalization has contributed to migration of subsistence agricultural workers into urban salaried jobs. Popov
(2015) investigates the determinants of firm-on-the-job training and finds that credit constrained firms have
a 38% lower probability of investing in on-the-job training. Benito and Hernando (2007) cover Spanish firms
from 1985-2000 and show that higher cash flow is associated with relatively more temporary employment. In
addition, they show that higher levels of financial pressure is associated with relatively lower levels of temporary
employment, while Caggese and Cuñat (2008) show for a sample of Italian firms that financing constraints bias
enterprises towards fixed-term rather than permanent contracts. Our paper contributes to this literature by
gauging the role of financing constraints in the relationship between firm growth and skilled job creation.
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Our study also contributes to the literature on finance and firms’ labor market decisions. In this literature
Benmelech, Bergman and Seru (2011) investigate the responsiveness of employment with respect to firms’ fi-
nancial health and aggregate unemployment outcomes. Also in this literature, while studies concentrating of
financial leverage have commonly concentrated on leverage-growth relationship (Lang et al., 1996), others such
as Cantor (1990) have investigated the effects of leverage on corporate investment and employment growth.
Further papers related to leverage and employment include Sharpe (1994) who models financial imperfections,
firm leverage and the cyclicality of employment. Berk, Stanton and Zechner (2010) the optimal labor contract
for levered firms and Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang (2013) examine empirically the effect of leverage on labor
costs. Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011) study the importance of financial markets for unemployment fluc-
tuations and Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider and Rosen (2000) study the effect of income taxes and entrepreneur’s
use of labor. All these papers add intuition into the potential mechanisms that could explain parts of our results.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the composition of our data
and section 3 on the benchmark econometric model. Section 4 presents the main empirical findings. Section 5
presents a series of robustness checks and tackles the endogeneity concerns with respect to financial access and
firm performance. Lastly, section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data that we utilize in this study comes from a small business survey conducted in 2013, in Uganda. The
project was funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) and Financial Sector Deepening
Trust Uganda (FSD-U). The survey was administered by an independent consulting company and in total data
from 1839 small and medium sized businesses were collected. The majority of the survey respondents were
either owners of the firm or higher level managers that had adequate access to firm financial and operational
information.1 The survey data provides information on firm financials, operations and most importantly, de-
tailed answers on employment characteristics. The data covers 1839 firms from all 5 regions and 79 districts as
well as 16 sectors. The businesses are sampled from sectors such as manufacturing, construction, agricultural,
forestry, and utilities. Firms were randomly selected to take part in the survey and compliance was optional.
For the purpose of this study, we exclude all financial firms from our analysis. The firms surveyed come from
all five regions throughout Uganda. Table 1 describes the composition of our data-set with respect to location,
region and sector classifications.
[Insert here Table 1]
1To be exact, 1,256 of the respondents were owners and over 450 were identified as managers.
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2.1 Labor and Employment Variables
The main focus of this study is to understand the determinants of firms’ employment composition and especially
the demand for skilled labor. To serve this purpose, our survey categorizes five different types of employment.
Specifically, the categories that we identify are (i) Trained, (ii) Experienced, (iii) Permanent, (iv) Casual and
(v) Family/Friends. Trained employees are those who have a formal training appropriate for their particular
occupation, while Experienced employees are those who have work experience for at least two consecutive years
in a particular occupation; we refer to these as skilled employees. Permanent employees are those who have
worked at the interviewed firm on a daily basis for at least 3 consecutive months, while Casual employees are
part time workers and Family employees are either family, relatives or friends. Skilled employees are expected
to be more costly for the firm. In order to draw a clear picture to this end, the survey asks respondents to
provide the average monthly salary that they pay to each category of employees. The survey responses show
that the average salary for skilled employee is almost double than that of other employees, 225,700 Ugandan
Shilling for trained and experienced compared to 135,400 Ugandan shillings for casual and family employees.
Even within the same firm, we find that average wages for trained and experienced workers are 312% higher
than for casual and family workers. Therefore, we conjecture that the hiring rates and the demand for skilled
workers is adversely affected by firms’ access to finance compared to overall demand for employees.
To deepen our understanding concerning employment dynamics, the survey also asks the respondents if the
labor demand for the categories (i)-(v) above increased, decreased or stayed the same over the last 12 months
(i.e. we ask whether the firm hired or fired employees the past one year). This allows us to investigate the
dynamics governing the composition of employment. We would like to highlight that the employee categories
(i)-(v) are not fully distinct from one another and there are clear overlaps among certain variables. For example,
there might be certain cases where a firm employee is a permanent employee (i) as well as a family member (v).
We present summary statistics of the key variables in table 2. We observe very few firms who hire employees.
In fact, over 75% of the firms do not hire employees in our data. To be exact, we observe 159 firms that
hire permanent employees, 66 that hire casual employees, 37 that hire family employees, 91 that hire trained
employees and 93 that hire experienced employees.
2.2 Firm Performance, Financing Constraints and Control Variables
In our regression analysis, firm performance is going to be proxied by either sales or profits. The survey asks
each firm its sales and profits from the previous month, where profits refer to the total income after paying all
expenses including wages for employees, taxes, rents, interest expenditures etc., but not including any income
paid to the owner. In addition, the survey asks whether sales and profits had increased or decreased when
compared to the same month of the last year. With this recall information, we are tracking the dynamics in
firm performance over time.
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In order to measure the degree of firms’ financing constraints, we utilize information on whether a firm
has outstanding loans and whether the firm has applied for a loan. This information allows us to identify
firms who are discouraged from applying for loans. There are many firms in our sample who never applied
for a loan, however, would need a commercial loan for their operations. In line with earlier and established
research, we split the sample based on categories of financial access as (i) Applied and Got a Loan (ii) Can-
not Get a Loan and (iii) Do not Need a Loan. Group (i) consists of firms who applied for a loan and got
accepted to receive one.2 Group (ii) include firms that applied for a loan, but got rejected as well as firms
that did not apply for a loan, but state in the survey that they need a loan for their operations. Group (iii)
includes all the firms who have not applied for a loan, because they do not need a loan for their business.
Including this third group allows us to disentangle between demand and supply-side constraints. The data in
Table 2 show that 62.5% of firms were either rejected or discouraged from applying, while 10.5% received a loan.
We include a set of additional control variables in our econometric analysis. As a standard control variable to
proxy size, we include the log of invested capital. InvestedCapital measures the investments made by the firm
over the past 12 months. These purchases include machinery, equipment (including computers and software),
buildings, land, training/human capital for the employees and other investment.3 We include BusinessAge to
measure firm experience. As firms with higher R&D expenses require more formal and high skilled employees,
we add a dummy variable to our benchmark regression equation, which will be equal to one if the firm introduced
any innovative product, service or process over the past two years. Lastly, we include the education of the owner
as a control variable. It might be that owners who have a higher education truly understand the benefits derived
from skilled employment. Because of this, they might have a large influence on the employment composition of
the firm. Therefore, we include dummy variables LowEducation, MediumEducation and HighEducation in
our regressions. The owner is regarded as having a LowEducation if he has no education or just primary school
education. We classify MediumEducation if the owner has a secondary degree education and HighEducation
if they have a tertiary, university (undergraduate), postgraduate (Masters, Doctors or PhD) degree education.
We maintain the education groups Other as the base category in our analysis. The Appendix provides more
information on the different variables.
Table 3 presents correlation among our variables, with the values in parentheses reporting significance of
each correlation. As table 3 shows, our main performance indicators changes in profits and sales compared to
the year before (DProfit and DSales) are positively correlated with hiring trained, experienced and permanent
employees, but not for hiring casual and family employees. As expected, higher firm size and financial access is
correlated with all five employee type hiring variables.
2For consistency, we drop 11 observations from the sample where firms admitted to having a loan, but have never applied for a
loan.
3Other investments firms made included purchases of furniture, agriculture related investments such as livestock, rental expendi-
tures, nets, watering pipes, boats and all other kinds of miscellaneous items. While we have information on the total CapitalStock
of firms, only a small proportion of the firms in the sample disclosed this information.
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[Insert here Table 2]
[Insert here Table 3]
3 Model and Methodology
To explore the effects of performance and financial access on dynamics of employment composition, we will
estimate the following empirical specification:
ChangeinEmployeeik = α0 + β1PerformanceGroupi ∗AppliedandGotLoani
+ β2PerformanceGroupi ∗ CannotGetaLoani + λXi + εi. (1)
The dependent variable, ChangeinEmployee, is based on the five different categories of employment that we
consider; namely, trained, experienced, permanent, casual and family. The firm is indexed by i and the type
of employment is denoted via the subscript k. We vary these variables by examining the hiring decisions at
employee type k. We will use both extensive and intensive margins of hiring decisions. First, we will use a
dummy variable equalling to to 1 if the firm had hired (variable DHire ) an employee from a particular category
of k in the past 12 months, thus the extensive margin demand for employment. In a second step, we incorporate
the actual quantity of employees hired, which measures the intensive hiring margin.
On the right hand side of our regressions, we proxy the performance of the firm based on two measures:
Changes in Sales and Changes in Profits. PerformanceGroup variables are categorical variables that indicate
whether sales or profits increased or decreased. Specifically, variables DSales and DProfits take the value of 1
if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 if there was a decrease in sales or profits
compared to the performance of the firm a year ago.4
Our baseline regressions are estimated via standard OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) for the extensive margin
and Tobit models for the intensive margin. We use Tobit for our intensive margin regression analysis in order
to account for left censoring in the dependent variable. We use OLS instead of probit or logit models for the
extensive margin regressions, as we would otherwise lose sectoral and locational cells where either all or (more
likely) no firm hires employees of a specific type. We use tobit regressions for the regressions with actual hiring
as the dependent variable, as we need to account for both the probability of being above the limit (in this case
zero), as well as the continuous values of hiring above zero.
The main interest of all our regressions will be to evaluate the significance of the interaction terms be-
4While the survey also asked respondents to quantify the realized profits and sales, very few of them were able to provide this
information. Survey questions in developing countries are typically phrased in such a manner so that it is most conceivable for
the respondents. For example, in many cases firms are only able report their monthly revenues. This is mainly because they do
not have any systematic book keeping or reliable estimates for annual performance. Therefore, our questions are also phrased in
monthly terms.
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tween financial access and performance. To test formally whether access to finance interacts with measures
of performance in determining the changes in employment composition, we conduct Wald tests as follows.
H0 = β1PerformanceGroupi ∗AppliedandGotLoani = β2PerformanceGroupi ∗ CannotGetaLoani = 0
4 Empirical Results
We begin our analysis by establishing the relationship between performance and hiring skilled labor. We report
the results in table 4 to gauge the interaction between firm performance and hiring skilled employment. The
results are as expected, showing a positive relationship between sales or profit growth and hiring of skilled
employees. Somewhat surprising, we find that financially constrained (i.e. rejected or discouraged) firms are
more likely to hire than firms without demand for external finance, while firms with external funding are as
likely as firms with no demand to hire trained or experienced workers. We report these results so that we can
compare our interactions of interest to this benchmark specification.
[Insert here Table 4]
The results in Table 5 show that only growing firms with access to external funding translate this growth
into hiring of skilled employees. The results show financial constraints have a significant effect on the rela-
tionship between firm performance and hiring decisions. In our regressions, the main coefficients of interest
are the interaction terms, which we present at the top rows of each table. We see that higher performance
and higher levels of financial access is associated with a higher propensity to hire skilled employment. Firms
who experience increases in performance (via profit or sales) and at the same time also have a bank loan, hire
more trained and experienced employees when compared to their well-performing but constrained counterparts,
who don’t have access to external finance. This result is in line with what has been proposed by Kaplan and
Zingales (1997). We provide indicative evidence that cash flow (or performance) and human capital investment
sensitivities behave in a similar manner in emerging economies and with respect to formal levels of employment.
The economic effects of our regressions are also significant and sizable. The first column in table 5 shows that
among firms with rising profits, firms with access to loans are 6.5 percentage points more likely to hire trained
and 7 percentage points more likely to hire experienced employees than financially constrained firms. Given
that the average likelihood of hiring trained or experienced workers is 5%, this is a large economic effect. The
Wald tests of the differences of the coefficients show that this difference is significant. Also, both constrained
and unconstrained firms are more likely to hire skilled employees than firms who do not demand external funding.
Turning to the control variables in our regressions we find that larger firms, measured by invested capital,
are more likely to hire trained and experienced employees. In addition, firms that introduced a new innovative
product, are also more likely to hire skilled labor. Our results do not find any evidence for the effects of firm
age or education of the business owner on the propensity to hire more skilled employees.
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[Insert here Table 5]
The results in Table 6 show that financing constraints matter not only for the extensive but also intensive
margin. We now incorporate the realized values for hiring skilled employees. Specifically, we run the same
regression structure as in Table 5, except we use realized hiring numbers and we estimate the model via a
Tobit censored regression model. The results in Table 6 are consistent with our previous findings on the
extensive margin. For experienced employees, our variables of interest remain significant and the null hypothesis
(interactions are equal to one another) is rejected under both specifications. The results for trained employees
are less significant, however, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients are in line with our earlier results.
In terms of economic effect, firms with a positive performance and access to external funding employ between
0.3-3.5 more skilled employees than firms with positive performance and financing constraints.
[Insert here Table 6]
The results in Table 7 show that access to external funding is not relevant for hiring decisions of less skilled
workers, including casual and family workers. Here, we test whether financing constraints could also be relevant
for hiring decisions of permanent or casual employees or family members. While theory does not make a clear
prediction on the hiring of permanent employees, as they could be either skilled or not-skilled, theory does not
predict any impact of access to external funding for the hiring decisions of casual workers or family members.
We present the empirical results for this classification in table 7. Nearly all our coefficients of interest are
insignificant, suggesting that growing firms with greater levels of financial access do not employ potentially
lower skilled employees. These results remain the same for various econometric specifications. We note that
in some cases financially constrained firms are more likely to hire other forms of labor. This might imply a
substitution effect on employment. These results are intuitive, but we cannot establish this relationship for all
our econometric specifications. Our results, therefore, indicate that alleviating financial constraints has a clear
effect on relatively high-skilled labor as opposed to the lower skilled and informal employment. As mentioned
earlier, casual and family employees are often less costly and they often add proportionally less to firm value
than high skilled employees. Our analysis shows that informal employment demand is often met on a firm
level and therefore changes in performance have negligible effects on their composition. Our data shows that
well-performing firms are more interested in hiring a highly skilled workforce and financial access can help firms
on this objective.
[Insert here Table 7]
5 Robustness Tests
In this section, we present a series of robustness tests. First, we address endogeneity concerns of our financial
access and performance variables, with respect to reverse causality. In addition, we conduct a robustness test
where we alter our financial access sub-groups. Finally, we use alternative econometric specifications to test the
sensitivity of our results to the model specification.
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5.1 Addressing Reverse Causality
Reverse causality is a concern for our model, as it is likely that changes in employment quality could have
an effect on firms’ probability of financing as well as firm performance. It may be that changes in employee
composition are what drive the access to finance. The higher the quantity of skilled employees, the larger the
firm, the greater legitimacy for loan applications. Because of this reverse causality concern, our model might
be improperly identified. To address this possible bias, we analyze the effects of firm performance and financial
access on planned hiring. For this, we utilize a survey question on how many trained, experienced, permanent
and casual employees firms plan to hire over the upcoming 12 months. We run the same regressions as before,
except that our dependent variable is now PlannedHiring. Unlike contemporaneous hiring, which might affect
access to external funding (by, e.g., sending positive signals to lender), it is less likely that future hiring plans
influence today’s access to external finance.5
We run the same models as before with planned hiring of firms as a dependent variable. The DPlanned
Hiring variable measures the hiring intentions of the firm. The variable takes a value of one if the firm intends
to hire one or more employees in the future. In the survey approximately 300 firms gave actual values to these
questions of which only around a 100 admitted to not planning to hire anyone in the future. All other 1500
observations were labeled as missing values. In order to have enough observations to conduct this analysis,
we convert all missing values to zero. We understand that this is a strong assumption; and therefore, we also
perform alternative conversions to assure that our findings are not solely a result of this conversion. Specifically,
we only convert missing values that were labeled as “do not know” as zero. With this, for each employment
type, we only converted approximately 60 missing observations. This is a more conservative conversion and it
still reflects adequately the intention to hire for each respondent. Even though, certain companies planned on
hiring in the future, this might not happen in reality. At this point, we are mainly interested in the intention
to hire and the answer “do not know” can reasonably be interpreted as a zero value. With this specification,
our results are very much in line with our prior findings. For clarity, responses are not driven by the position of
the responder in the firm. As we mentioned before, 1,248 out of the total 1,839 respondents were owners of the
firm and therefore “do not know” responses are not driven by the answers given by managers or other employee
statuses.
Table 8 shows a positive and significant relationship between the interaction of profit/sales growth and access
to external funding, on the one hand, and future hiring of trained or experienced employees, on the other hand.
Columns (1)-(4) report the result that converts all the missing values to zero and columns (5)-(8) with the more
conservative conversion. Overall, the results are very similar to our prior findings. Firms with greater financial
access and positive performance plan to hire more high skilled employees. Our Wald tests are significant across
5We acknowledge that we cannot fully eliminate this concern. It could be argued that because firms were planning to steadily
increase employment over the next few years, this is the reason they applied for the loan in the first place. This might happen in
order to cover for the gradual increases in costs.
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all specifications and the magnitude of all coefficients are very similar to those found in earlier regressions. Most
notably, our first interaction PerformanceIncrease ∗AppliedandGotaLoan remains strongly significant across
nearly all specifications. These results suggest that greater financial access encourage well-performing firms to
plan on hiring more high skilled employees. In economic terms, growing firms with access to external funding
are between 8 and 42 percentage points more likely to plan to hire skilled employees than growing firms with
financing constraints. These results suggest that greater financial access encourage firms to plan on hiring more
high skilled employees.
[Insert here Table 8]
Additionally we also test whether our results hold with actual values for planned employment, thus the
intensive margin planned hiring, as well. Firms reported that they were planning to hire on average between
0-30 employees depending on the employee type. In this setting, we ran the same Tobit regressions as before,
with real values for planned hiring and converting only the “do not know” replies to zero. We present the
Tobit regression results in table 9. Under this specification, the majority of our results remain consistent with
the previous findings. Firms who have positive performance and access to bank credit plan to employ between
1.3-4.5 more skilled employees than firms with positive performance but no access to bank credit.
[Insert here Table 9]
Finally, to control for the fact that firms might exhibit some persistence over time with respect to hiring
behaviour, we include actual current hiring in our planned hiring regressions. We conduct separate regressions
where we include a dummy variable as well as the real hiring variable on whether the firm had previously hired
a particular skilled employee. We present the results in table 10. In columns 1-4, we present the regression
results for the extensive margin and columns 5-8 for the intensive margin while controlling for realized hiring
behavior. Our results remain consistent with our earlier findings, firms with higher financial access and positive
firm performance hire more skilled employees than constrained firms.
[Insert here Table 10]
5.2 Alternative Loan Group Specification
In this section, we take a closer look into the division of our financial access sub samples. Specifically, we distin-
guish among firms with financing constraints between those that were rejected and those that were discouraged,
though we expect the differences between these two groups to be small. The purpose of this exercise is to
separate these groups and to test whether there are further differences in employment composition. In addition,
we use this to test the consistency and robustness of our results while altering our financial access sub samples.
The results in table 11 show a significant role for external funding in hiring decisions of skilled employees.
All of our previous findings remain consistent across all specifications. Firms with greater financial access
11
(i.e. Applied for a Loan and Got a Loan) increase skilled employment relatively more than their constrained
counterparts as performance increases. The results from the Wald tests are in line with these results. As well as
testing whether all three interactions are equal to one another, we also conduct Wald tests separately between
two interactions for all possible combinations. For example, in the lower rows of table 11, “Test12 Chi” tests for
the equality between the first and second interaction and “Test 23 Chi” between the second and third interaction
respectively. By doing so, we formally test for the significant differences among all financial access sub-samples.
The results from these alternative specifications are also in line with the prior results. Based on the Wald tests,
nearly all our interactions are significantly distinct from one another. Coefficients are broadly significant and
are in line with prior results claiming that greater financial access and positive performance increase the hiring
rates of skilled employment.
[Insert here Table 11]
5.3 Other Robustness Tests
Estimating regressions where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable is more often better implemented
by using other limited dependent variable estimators such as Probit and Logit. When using OLS regressions
with dichotomous dependent variables, predicted probabilities are not necessarily bounded by values 0 and
1. OLS also assumes that there is a linear and additive relationship between the dependent and independent
variables and this is not always necessarily the case. Due to these inherent difficulties and more, we perform
alternative tests by incorporating a Probit model. We present the results from this estimation strategy in Table
12. Results from these tests are in line with our prior results.
[Insert here Table 12]
To further address potential concerns regarding omitted variables, we interact all the firm level controls with
the financial access variables. The results from these regressions are reported in Table 13. Our main findings
remain unchanged and we continue to show that firms with greater financial access and positive performance
have a higher probability of employing skilled labor, with significance levels and coefficient sizes similar to our
baseline results. These results thus show that the interaction of firm growth with access to external funding
does not proxy for the interaction of access to external finance with other firm characteristics.
[Insert here Table 13]
6 Conclusion
We use a micro and small enterprise survey from Uganda and show that performance and higher financial access
is positively correlated with changes in high skilled employment. We find that firms with positive performance
and a bank loan hire more trained and experienced employees. On the one hand, firms with greater financial
flexibility are more likely to hire skilled labor once their performance goes up. On the other hand, firms who
12
are financially constrained, must save a greater proportion of the additional profits (or pay other expenses
associated with financial constraints) and therefore cannot invest further in greater levels of employment. We
further investigate this relationship and show that performance and financial access do not explain the hiring
rates of informal employees, which include casual and family employees. These are intuitive results and shape
our understanding on firm employment decisions. Better access to external funding can thus be an accelerator
of human capital investment demand and growth.
The results from our study underline the importance of financial sector development for employment. As
firms grow and become profitable, employment opportunities will increase for those who are formally trained,
educated and more experienced. With this, the labor force can become more permanent and potentially more
stable as well. This is a strong and important issue for many nations and especially developing countries. The
youth is educated and governments need to find ways to employ the highly qualified workers. We have shown
that policymakers have yet another reason why they should tackle small firms’ financing constraints.
13
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Table 1: Sector and Region Composition
REGION
SECTOR NORTHERN EASTERN WESTERN CENTRAL KAMPALA Total
No. Col % No. Col % No. Col % No. Col % No. Col % No. Col %
ACCOMODATION 26 15.0 22 8.6 32 7.4 43 6.7 17 5.1 140 7.6
AGRICULTURE 3 1.7 48 18.8 50 11.6 178 27.6 22 6.6 301 16.4
CONSTRUCTION 4 2.3 6 2.3 12 2.8 7 1.1 9 2.7 38 2.1
EDUCATION & HEALTH 31 17.9 33 12.9 49 11.4 96 14.9 29 8.7 238 12.9
FINANCIAL 18 10.4 8 3.1 84 19.5 11 1.7 5 1.5 126 6.9
FOOD PROCESSING 18 10.4 39 15.2 27 6.3 43 6.7 21 6.3 148 8.0
INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION 10 5.8 16 6.3 42 9.7 22 3.4 26 7.8 116 6.3
MINING 1 0.6 5 2.0 5 1.2 17 2.6 7 2.1 35 1.9
OTHER MANUFACTURING 27 15.6 12 4.7 47 10.9 59 9.2 24 7.2 169 9.2
REAL ESTATE 1 0.6 0 0.0 6 1.4 34 5.3 40 11.9 81 4.4
RECREATION & PERSONAL 13 7.5 24 9.4 40 9.3 71 11.0 42 12.5 190 10.3
TRADING 14 8.1 9 3.5 24 5.6 38 5.9 65 19.4 150 8.2
TRANSPORT, UTILITIES & STORAGE 7 4.0 34 13.3 13 3.0 25 3.9 28 8.4 107 5.8
Total 173 100.0 256 100.0 431 100.0 644 100.0 335 100.0 1839 100.0
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
(a) Employment Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max p25 p50 p75
DHire Permanent 1,732 0.0918 0.289 0 1 0 0 0
DHire Casual 1,701 0.0388 0.193 0 1 0 0 0
DHire Family 1,696 0.0218 0.146 0 1 0 0 0
DHire Trained 1,704 0.0534 0.225 0 1 0 0 0
DHire Experienced 1,694 0.0549 0.228 0 1 0 0 0
Hire Trained 1,704 0.256 1.933 0 54 0 0 0
Hire Experienced 1,694 0.231 1.427 0 25 0 0 0
Hire Permanent 1,732 0.430 2.495 0 54 0 0 0
Hire Casual 1,701 0.156 1.083 0 20 0 0 0
Hire Family 1,696 0.0619 0.692 0 17 0 0 0
DPlanned Trained 1,733 0.0912 0.288 0 1 0 0 0
DPlanned Experienced 1,723 0.105 0.307 0 1 0 0 0
Planned Trained 287 1.289 1.852 0 20 0 1 2
Planned Experienced 277 1.466 2.217 0 30 0 1 2
(b) Performance, Financial and Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max p25 p50 p75
DProfit 1,828 -0.0350 0.796 -1 1 -1 0 1
DSales 1,606 -0.0199 0.880 -1 1 -1 0 1
Applied for Loan 1,839 0.407 0.491 0 1 0 0 1
Applied and got a Loan 1,839 0.105 0.307 0 1 0 0 0
Applied and was rejected a Loan 1,839 0.302 0.459 0 1 0 0 1
Cannot Get Loan 1,839 0.625 0.484 0 1 0 1 1
Invested Capital 1,603 8.961e+06 5.794e+07 0 1.010e+09 0 0 1.500e+06
Business Age 1,812 10.02 7.678 1 70 5 8 12
New Innovative Product 1,839 0.259 0.438 0 1 0 0 1
Low Education 1,839 0.182 0.386 0 1 0 0 0
Medium Education 1,839 0.275 0.447 0 1 0 0 1
High Education 1,839 0.520 0.500 0 1 0 1 1
Notes: The Hiring variables with the letter ”D” indicate that the variable is a dummy variable. The performance








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Extensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees and Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Applied and got a Loan 0.028 0.031 0.044* 0.046*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025)
Cannot Get Loan 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.028** 0.030**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Innovative Product 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.054*** 0.056***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Low Education 0.007 -0.002 0.018 0.011
(0.037) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042)
Medium Education 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.010
(0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041)
High Education 0.040 0.043 0.052 0.055
(0.037) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
R-squared 0.087 0.097 0.069 0.075
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows our baseline estimation results for the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm performance
and financial constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable for whether the firm hired trained or experienced employees in the past 12 months. Variables
DSales and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 if there
was a decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. The Dummy CannotGetaLoan,
includes firms who applied for a loan, but do not have a loan and also firms who did not apply for a loan, but state in the
survey that they need a loan for their operations. We estimate columns 1 to 4 using an OLS regression. To control for
unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we include sector and region fixed dummies in all our estimations. The
result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom of the table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms
between performance and financial access are equal to one another. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Extensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DHire Trained DHire Trained DHire Experienced DHire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.124** 0.149**
(0.060) (0.064)
Profit Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.059*** 0.079***
(0.022) (0.023)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.103* 0.119**
(0.055) (0.059)






Applied and got a Loan -0.005 -0.005 0.003 0.005
(0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026)
Cannot Get Loan 0.018 0.018 0.005 0.005
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Innovative Product 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.053*** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Low Education 0.007 -0.007 0.019 0.005
(0.037) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042)
Medium Education 0.017 0.011 0.013 0.005
(0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041)
High Education 0.040 0.039 0.051 0.050
(0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
R-squared 0.096 0.103 0.082 0.083
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 5.114 4.565 8.039 5.822
Prob > F-val 0.00613 0.0106 0.000338 0.00305
Notes: This table shows our baseline estimation results for the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm performance
and financial constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable for whether the firm hired trained or experienced employees in the past 12 months. Variables
DSales and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 if there
was a decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. The Dummy CannotGetaLoan,
includes firms who applied for a loan, but do not have a loan and also firms who did not apply for a loan, but state in the
survey that they need a loan for their operations. We estimate columns 1 to 4 using an OLS regression. To control for
unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we include sector and region fixed dummies in all our estimations. The
result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom of the table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms
between performance and financial access are equal to one another. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
20
Table 6: Intensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees
(1) (3) (5) (7)
VARIABLES Hire Trained Hire Trained Hire Experienced Hire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 8.758* 7.565**
(5.048) (3.417)
Profit Increased* Cannot Get Loan 5.243* 6.712**
(3.066) (2.620)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 8.445 7.067**
(5.248) (3.545)






Applied and got a Loan -1.650 -2.010 0.257 0.063
(4.065) (4.222) (2.327) (2.436)
Cannot Get Loan 2.548 1.441 0.616 0.032
(2.401) (2.467) (1.665) (1.726)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.426** 0.434** 0.246*** 0.239***
(0.166) (0.171) (0.091) (0.092)
Business Age -0.063 -0.061 -0.073 -0.073
(0.092) (0.098) (0.069) (0.072)
New Innovative Product 7.633*** 7.636*** 4.421*** 4.466***
(2.458) (2.486) (1.460) (1.481)
Low Education -1.026 -3.954 2.353 0.813
(6.227) (6.513) (4.483) (4.509)
Medium Education 1.606 1.201 1.129 0.566
(5.967) (6.129) (4.356) (4.360)
High Education 4.295 4.195 4.421 4.104
(5.866) (5.981) (4.253) (4.231)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 2.031 2.104 3.743 3.415
Prob > F-val 0.132 0.122 0.0239 0.0332
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm performance and
financial constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The dependent
variable is realized hiring variable measuring the amount of trained or experienced employees the firm hired in the past
12 months. Variables DSales and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no
change and -1 if there was a decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. The Dummy
CannotGetaLoan, includes firms who applied for a loan, but do not have a loan and also firms who did not apply for
a loan, but state in the survey that they need a loan for their operations. We estimate columns 1 to 4 using a Tobit
regression where we account for left censoring at zero. To control for unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects,
we include sector and region dummies in all our estimations. The result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom
of the table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms between performance and financial access are equal
to one another. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Extensive Margin Effects: Hiring Other Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES DHire Permanent DHire Permanent DHire Casual DHire Casual DHire Family DHire Family
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.103 0.015 0.029
(0.066) (0.044) (0.045)
Profit Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.098*** 0.040* 0.021
(0.030) (0.021) (0.014)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.073 -0.006 0.013
(0.062) (0.043) (0.043)
Sales Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.109*** 0.021 0.012
(0.029) (0.021) (0.015)
DProfit 0.002 -0.008 -0.000
(0.013) (0.010) (0.006)
DSales 0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.013) (0.011) (0.006)
Applied and got a Loan 0.002 0.012 0.003 0.009 0.024 0.031
(0.028) (0.032) (0.021) (0.025) (0.017) (0.021)
Cannot Get Loan 0.012 0.009 -0.002 0.001 0.008 0.012
(0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.009)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001* 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business Age -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
New Innovative Product 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.023 0.024 0.026** 0.028**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013)
Low Education 0.033 0.013 0.024* 0.020 0.005 0.001
(0.051) (0.057) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
Medium Education 0.036 0.024 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.016 0.013
(0.051) (0.056) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)
High Education 0.070 0.060 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.033*** 0.032***
(0.050) (0.055) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 1,396 1,265 1,371 1,240 1,370 1,239
R-squared 0.098 0.112 0.034 0.036 0.046 0.048
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 5.772 6.968 1.790 0.633 1.186 0.307
Prob > F-val 0.00319 0.000978 0.167 0.531 0.306 0.736
Notes: This table shows our baseline estimation results for the relationship between hiring other labor (permanent,
casual and family), firm performance and financial constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section
2 and the Appendix. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the firm hired permanent, casual or family
employees in the past 12 months. Variables DSales and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased,
0 if there was no change and -1 if there was a decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a
year ago. The Dummy CannotGetaLoan, includes firms who applied for a loan, but do not have a loan and also firms
who did not apply for a loan, but state in the survey that they need a loan for their operations. We estimate columns
1 to 6 using an OLS regression. To control for unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we include sector and
region dummies in all our estimations. The result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom of the table. The
null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms between performance and financial access are equal to one another.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Alternative Financial Access Measures, Extensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DHire Trained DHire Trained DHire Experienced DHire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.123** 0.149**
(0.060) (0.064)
Profit Increased* Applied and was Rejected a Loan 0.035 0.069**
(0.026) (0.029)
Profit Increased* Did not Apply but Needs Loan Service 0.086*** 0.091***
(0.033) (0.032)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.103* 0.119**
(0.055) (0.059)
Sales Increased* Applied and was Rejected a Loan 0.042 0.072**
(0.026) (0.028)






Applied and got a Loan -0.005 -0.005 0.003 0.005
(0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026)
Applied and was rejected a Loan 0.016 0.011 0.006 -0.001
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Did not apply for Loan but Needs Loan Services 0.020 0.025* 0.004 0.011
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business Age -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
New Innovative Product 0.064*** 0.052***
(0.018) (0.018)
Low Education 0.006 0.018
(0.038) (0.038)
Medium Education 0.017 0.013
(0.038) (0.037)
High Education 0.041 0.051
(0.037) (0.037)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
R-squared 0.099 0.106 0.082 0.084
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 3.682 3.180 5.379 3.964
Prob > F-val 0.0117 0.0233 0.00111 0.00795
Test12 F-val 0.0659 0.0670 0.00636 0.00971
Test13 F-val 0.00571 0.0169 0.00174 0.0206
Test23 F-val 0.0206 0.0292 0.00219 0.00924
Notes: This table shows the alternative estimation results for the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm per-
formance and financial constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the firm hired trained or experienced employees in the past 12
months. Variables DSales and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no
change and -1 if there was a decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. We estimate
columns 1 to 4 using an OLS regression. To control for unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we include
sector and region dummies in all our estimations. The result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom of the
table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms between performance and financial access are equal to one
another. We also conduct Wald tests separately between two interactions for all possible combinations. ”Test12 Chi”
tests for the equality between the first and second interaction, ”Test 23 Chi” between the second and third interaction
and ”Test 13 Chi” between the first and third interaction. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Extensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DHire Trained DHire Trained DHire Experienced DHire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.910** 1.015**
(0.437) (0.398)
Profit Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.454* 0.759***
(0.265) (0.273)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.861* 0.907**
(0.460) (0.413)






Applied and got a Loan -0.043 -0.057 0.011 0.002
(0.322) (0.338) (0.272) (0.292)
Cannot Get Loan 0.340 0.273 0.037 -0.013
(0.221) (0.221) (0.191) (0.205)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Business Age -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
New Innovative Product 0.603*** 0.613*** 0.443*** 0.452***
(0.150) (0.157) (0.145) (0.148)
Low Education -0.070 -0.350 0.257 0.076
(0.531) (0.564) (0.494) (0.508)
Medium Education 0.223 0.173 0.153 0.078
(0.510) (0.534) (0.483) (0.492)
High Education 0.437 0.427 0.571 0.536
(0.488) (0.506) (0.468) (0.474)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 5.179 4.839 9.619 7.602
Prob > Chi2 0.0750 0.0890 0.00815 0.0224
Notes: This table shows the results for the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm performance and financial
constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable for whether the firm hired trained or experienced employees in the past 12 months. Variables DSales
and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 if there was a
decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. The Dummy CannotGetaLoan, includes
firms who applied for a loan, but do not have a loan and also firms who did not apply for a loan, but state in the
survey that they need a loan for their operations. We estimate columns 1 to 4 using a Probit regression. To control for
unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we include sector and region fixed dummies in all our estimations. The
result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom of the table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms
between performance and financial access are equal to one another. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Extensive Margin Effects: Hiring Skilled Employees and Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DHire Trained DHire Trained DHire Experienced DHire Experienced
Profit Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.115** 0.134**
(0.058) (0.062)
Profit Increased* Cannot Get Loan 0.058*** 0.079***
(0.022) (0.022)
Sales Increased* Applied and got a Loan 0.098* 0.106*
(0.054) (0.059)






Applied and got a Loan -0.051 -0.060 -0.073 -0.089
(0.075) (0.080) (0.069) (0.073)
Cannot Get Loan 0.027 0.047 0.011 0.030
(0.067) (0.082) (0.065) (0.080)
ln(1+Invested Capital) 0.003* 0.003* 0.004* 0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(1+invested capital)* Applied and got a Loan -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(1+invested capital)* Cannot Get Loan 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Business Age* Applied and got a Loan -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Business Age* Cannot Get Loan -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Innovative Product* Applied and got a Loan 0.078 0.086 0.093* 0.102*
(0.049) (0.053) (0.056) (0.060)
New Innovative Product* Cannot Get Loan 0.048 0.048 0.086** 0.086**
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038)
Low Education* Applied and got a Loan 0.054 0.058 0.072 0.084
(0.077) (0.084) (0.076) (0.082)
Low Education* Cannot Get Loan -0.033 -0.065 -0.033 -0.064
(0.068) (0.082) (0.069) (0.083)
Medium Education* Applied and got a Loan 0.037 0.032 0.059 0.063
(0.074) (0.082) (0.072) (0.079)
Medium Education * Cannot Get Loan -0.011 -0.036 -0.017 -0.041
(0.069) (0.084) (0.066) (0.081)
High Education * Applied and got a Loan 0.084 0.092 0.093 0.106
(0.078) (0.083) (0.074) (0.078)
High Education * Cannot Get Loan -0.021 -0.045 -0.024 -0.047
(0.069) (0.084) (0.068) (0.081)
Business Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
New Innovative Product 0.024 0.026 -0.016 -0.015
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
Low Education 0.020 0.021 0.027 0.027
(0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.027)
Medium Education 0.019 0.023 0.013 0.014
(0.021) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020)
High Education 0.041* 0.048** 0.050** 0.056**
(0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023)
Observations 1,376 1,246 1,369 1,239
R-squared 0.101 0.109 0.088 0.091
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 4.931 4.345 7.742 5.360
Prob > F-val 0.00735 0.0132 0.000454 0.00481
Notes: This table shows the results for the relationship between hiring skilled labor, firm performance and financial
constraints. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Section 2 and the Appendix. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable for whether the firm hired trained or experienced employees in the past 12 months. Variables DSales
and DProfits take a value of 1 if the performance variable increased, 0 if there was no change and -1 if there was a
decrease in sales or profits compared to the performance of the firm a year ago. The Dummy CannotGetaLoan, includes
firms who applied for a loan, but do not have a loan and also firms who did not apply for a loan, but state in the
survey that they need a loan for their operations. We estimate columns 1 to 4 using an OLS regression. To control for
unobserved regional and sector level fixed effects, we include sector and region fixed dummies in all our estimations. The
result for the Wald Tests are reported in the bottom of the table. The null hypothesis assumes that the interaction terms
between performance and financial access are equal to one another. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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